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Iran’s Expanding Missile Arsenal and the Unsustainable Cost of Interception

Iran is believed to possess more than 17 types of ballistic missiles, and that variety matters. Not every missile presents the same challenge to defenders: range, speed, flight profile, manoeuvrability and launch pattern all affect how easily it can be detected, tracked and intercepted. In practice, this means air defence systems cannot rely on a single neat solution. Some threats may be engaged earlier and more efficiently, while others force defenders to use more advanced and expensive interceptors under severe time pressure.

That cost imbalance is stark. A single Patriot interceptor can cost at least USD 6 million, while a THAAD interceptor is estimated at roughly USD 12 million. When those systems are used against large volleys of ballistic missiles, the financial burden rises at extraordinary speed. Defensive success may look reassuring on the battlefield, but every interception also represents a major expenditure, especially when adversaries can launch relatively cheaper weapons in large numbers to exhaust both stockpiles and budgets.

Over the course of just three days, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reportedly said they had shot down around 400 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones. On that basis, the estimated cost of interceptions comes to roughly USD 2 billion for the missiles and another USD 6 billion for the drones. Even allowing for some variation in the exact mix of systems used, the total still points to an enormous financial shock. This is not merely a tactical contest; it is also a war of economic endurance.

That leads to the central question: how long can this pace of interceptions be maintained before the cost becomes unsustainable? No state can burn through billions every few days without facing hard trade-offs in procurement, readiness and wider defence planning. If attacks remain intense and prolonged, the issue may shift from whether these threats can be intercepted to whether they can be intercepted often enough, quickly enough and cheaply enough. In modern air defence, success is not only about stopping incoming fire; it is about whether the defender can afford to keep stopping it.

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